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Abstract
In this paper we develop an open economy model of firms' pricing behaviour under imperfect
competition.  This allows us to introduce various terms of trade effects influencing the firm's
pricing decision, in addition to labour costs which dominate most closed-economy
specifications of the New Keynesian Phillips (NKPC) curve. Our analysis gives rise to a
hybrid open economy NKPC which nests existing closed and open economy specifications
adopted in empirical work. We estimate this specification for the G7 economies and find that
the US, UK and Canada typically enjoy less inertia in price setting than the European G7
economies and Japan and that these estimates are both plausible and in line with survey
evidence. We also find that the proportion of firms which use simple backward-looking rules
of thumb in price setting is greater when the frequency of price change is smaller. Finally
there is evidence of significant asymmetries in price setting amongst EMU members.
JEL Classification: E3.
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The New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC), which links current in￿ation to
expectations of future in￿ation and a measure of excess demand in the form of
the output gap, has become a mainstay of modern macroeconomics as part of
the ￿New Neo-Classical Synthesis￿ (see Goodfriend and King (1997) for a dis-
cussion). However, until recently, this essential building block of contemporary
macroeconomics has been criticised on empirical grounds (see Mankiw and Reis
1(2001), for example), largely because it apparently fails to capture the degree
of in￿ation inertia many believe to be a feature of the data. Recent work on
the NKPC based on Calvo￿s (1983) overlapping contracts framework (see for
example Gali and Gertler (1999), Gali et al (2001), Sbordone (2002) and Leith
and Malley (2001)) suggests that, as a measure of in￿ationary pressures, the
output gap is a poor proxy for marginal costs. Accordingly, when a theoreti-
cally coherent NKPC is estimated for the US and Euro-area, using log-linearised
labour share data as a measure of marginal costs, the NKPC appears to be a
reasonable model of in￿ation.
In this paper we build on the insights of this approach, but extend the analy-
sis to take account of open economy terms of trade eﬀects in the determination
of output price in￿ation. More speci￿cally, we construct a model of ￿rms￿ price-
setting behaviour which allows ￿rms to sell their products in both home and
foreign markets and to substitute imported intermediate goods for domestic
labour in production. These extensions imply that we capture two channels
through which terms of trade eﬀects may in￿uence the ￿rm￿s price-setting de-
cisions via their impact on marginal costs. Firstly, we allow for changes in
demand for domestic products relative to those produced abroad and secondly
for changes in the prices of imported intermediate goods relative to other in-
puts in the production process. In our setup ￿rms will set their prices subject
to the constraints implied by Calvo contracts. When ￿rms are able to adjust
prices, some will set the new price to maximise the discounted value of future
pro￿ts, while others will follow a simple backward-looking rule of thumb which,
although not optimal in the short-run, will achieve the pro￿t-maximising price
in the long-run. The possible existence of rule of thumb price setters may re-
￿ect information processing costs along the lines of Sims (1998) and allows us
to measure the extent of backward-looking behaviour in price setting. Our for-
mulation gives rise to a speci￿cation of the NKPC which nests existing closed
and open economy models (see for example, Sbordone (2002), Gali et al (2000
and 2001) and Gali and Salido -Lopez (2001) and Balakrishan and Salido-Lopez
(2001)).
When we econometrically estimate our speci￿cation of price-setting behav-
iour for the G7 economies we ￿n dp l a u s i b l ee s t i m a t e so ft h ed e g r e eo fi n e r t i a
in each economy. Moreover these results suggest that the UK, US and Canada
enjoy less inertia than other European members of the G7 and Japan. Our
econometric work also suggests that the majority of ￿rms set prices optimally,
in a forward-looking manner, rather than following backward-looking rules of
thumb. It also appears to be the case that in countries where ￿rms change prices
relatively frequently, the proportion of backward-looking price setters increases.
This probably re￿ects the fact that the costs of failing to optimise every reset
price are lower when that price is unlikely to remain in force for long. Finally,
our results imply that there are signi￿cant asymmetries in the degree of price-
s t i c k i n e s sa m o n gE M Um e m b e rs t a t e sa sw e l la sa s y m m e t r i e si nt h ed e g r e eo f
backward-looking behaviour in price setting, which may be a cause for concern
for policy makers in the ECB.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we derive our
2open economy NKPC. In Section 3 we estimate the model for the G7 economies.
Section 4 contains our conclusions.
2 The Model
In this section we analyse a model of ￿rms￿ price-setting behaviour which takes
account of open economy terms of trade eﬀects in two main ways. Firstly, we
assume that imperfectly competitive ￿r m ss e l lt h e i rg o o d sb o t ha th o m ea n d
abroad and, therefore, that they take into account the price they set relative to
the prices set by other ￿rms, both at home and abroad. Secondly, we also assume
that ￿rms utilise imported intermediate goods in production so that changes in
the price of imported intermediate goods relative to domestic labour costs can
aﬀect the marginal costs of production. We further assume that ￿rms face the
constraints in price-setting implied by the use of Calvo (1983) contracts, in that
they can only change their prices after a random interval of time. Within this
constraint, we also allow ￿rms to adopt two forms of price-setting behaviour.
Some ￿rms set prices by maximising the expected discounted value of future
pro￿ts, while the remaining ￿rms choose to follow a simple rule of thumb which
updates their prices in line with in￿ation and the price changes they observed
in the previous period.
2.1 Product Demand
We ￿rst turn to consider the demand for the ￿rm￿s product1. We allow for the
possibility that goods produced at home and abroad are not identical in the
impact they have on utility. Speci￿cally, we assume that consumers maximise



























t is a CES index of consumer goods produced in











. We introduce the parameter, χ,
to account for a home bias in consumption. There are price indices associated
1In doing so it should be borne in mind that there is an implicit model of utility max-
imisation which allocates an individual￿s consumption spending across time. This can be the
usual consumption Euler equation or can include more complex dynamics, such as those aris-
ing from habits eﬀects as in Leith and Malley (2001). However, in analysing ￿rms￿ pricing
decisions, we only require knowledge of how consumer￿s allocate this consumption spending
across domestic and foreign goods.
3with each of these consumption bundles, such that we can de￿ne the composite































where εt is the nominal exchange rate de￿ned in terms of home currency relative
to foreign.
The CES form of the aggregate utility function implies that the relative





















. There are corresponding equations for the foreign
economy, where foreign variables are denoted by a ￿∗￿. If we assume that the
government allocates spending across goods in the same pattern as consumers
then the total demand for domestically produced goods for the purposes of




































There is an additional source of demand for domestically produced goods - we
assume that foreign ￿rms utilise a bundle of domestically produced goods in pro-
duction, just as domestic ￿rms employ a bundle of foreign produced goods in do-















2This price index is derived by minimising the cost of purchasing a single unit of the com-
posite consumption bundle, ct. The CES form of the utility function implies that to minimise
























allows us to eliminate c
f
t from this relationship and solve in terms of cd
t. The consumer price










t in this expression yields the
consumer price index de￿ned above.
4being the bundle of domestically produced products used in foreign production,
by foreign ￿rm i. As this composite intermediate good possesses the same de-
gree of substitutability between goods as the government and consumers￿ con-
sumption bundles, foreign ￿rms, domestic consumers and foreign consumers will

























t (z)dz is the average demand for home country pro-
duced goods for use in foreign ￿rms￿ production. The demand for the ￿rm￿s
product depends upon its price relative to the prices of other domestic producers,
as well as the amount of domestic and foreign, public and private consumption
and intermediate good demand allocated to domestically produced goods where
these proportions depend on the relative prices detailed in (5). Therefore, we
are allowing for substitution in demand between goods produced at home and
abroad in describing the demand for the representative domestic ￿rm￿s product.
2.2 Imported Intermediate Goods
We now turn to consider the second channel through which we introduce open
economy eﬀects into the ￿rm￿s pricing decision, by considering a production
















where N(z)t and m(z)
f
t are the labour input and imported intermediate goods
used in production. We model these inputs as imperfect substitutes and ρ
measures the elasticity of substitution between them. Firms also possess a stock
of capital, K, which is assumed, for simplicity, to be ￿xed and 1 − 1
ψ describes
the weight given to capital in production. Here the ￿rst-order conditions for
cost minimisation imply that the cost-minimising combination of labour and

















so that changes in the price of imported intermediate goods relative to labour
costs will result in a substitution between labour and intermediate import goods.






























































∂y(z)t (from equations 9 and 10) we can
decompose marginal cost into two elements - one which is independent of the
￿rms actions and the other which depends upon the position they are operating










































=( y(z)t)ψ−1 g MCt.
The ￿rst multiplicative term captures the increase in ￿rm speci￿c marginal costs
through increasing production given the ￿xed stock of capital3 and decreasing
marginal returns to the remaining factors. The second element re￿ects the
labour and intermediate goods costs that enter into the costs of production and
are constant across ￿rms. We label this second term, g MCt.
2.3 Proﬁt Maximising Price Setting
We can now start to consider the problem facing a ￿rm which chooses to set its
price in order to maximise pro￿ts. The real variable pro￿ts4 (de￿ated by con-
sumer prices, since the ￿rms are assumed to be owned by domestic consumers)














Such ￿rms are able to change their price with probability α in a given period,
so that 1
1−α measures the length of time a price contract is expected to exist.
3An alternative modelling strategy would be to allow capital to be reallocated across ￿rms
so as to equate the shadow value of capital, implying that each ￿rm￿s marginal cost is identical
to the economy-wide average cost (see Sbordone (2002) for a discussion). However, the pos-
sibility that ￿rms can reallocate capital without friction, but cannot reset prices continuously
seems implausible.
4We ignore the ￿xed costs of utilising the capital stock in formulating the ￿rm￿s problem
and we assume that all shocks are suﬃciently small that ￿rms continue to earn positive pro￿ts
at all points in time.
6This allows us to write the problem facing a ￿rm which is able to change prices











































































where the ￿rm discounts future pro￿ts at the gross real interest rate, rt. The





































































)sEt[d g MCt+s +( ψ − 1)b e yt+s + b Pt+s + θ(ψ − 1)b pd
t+s]








t is the average ￿rm output supplying domestic
and foreign, private and public demand. ￿Barred￿ variables denote steady-state
values of the variable, and ￿hatted￿ variables the percentage deviations of the
variable from its steady-state value. This in￿nite forward summation, can also
be quasi-diﬀerenced to give a ￿rst order diﬀerence equation describing the evo-







)b xt − d g MCt − (ψ − 1)b e yt − b Pt − θ(ψ − 1)b pd
t. (17)
The ￿rms which do not perform this optimisation, instead follow a rule of
thumb whereby they set a price equal to the average price set on the previous
period after scaling this up by the rate of in￿a t i o no b s e r v e di nt h ep r e v i o u s
period. Therefore, the log-linearised index of output prices is given by,
b pd
t = αb pd
t−1 +( 1− α)b pr
t (18)
7where pr
t is the average reset price in period t and is given by,
b pr
t =( 1− ω)b xt + ωb pb
t (19)
ω is the proportion of ￿rms following the rule of thumb, and pb
t is the price set
set according to the rule of thumb,
b pb
t = b pr
t−1 + b π
d
t−1. (20)
Substituting equation (20) into (19) gives,
b pr
t =( 1− ω)b xt + ωb pr
t−1 + ωb pd
t−1 − ωb pd
t−2. (21)
















+ωb pt−1 − ωb pt−2. (22)
This can be rearranged in terms of b xt, substituted into equation (20) and solved
using the de￿nition of output price in￿ation, b πt = b pd















(1 − ω)(1 − α)(1 − αβ)
(1 + (ψ − 1)θ)λ
(d g MCt (23)
+(ψ − 1)b e yt + b Pt − b pd
t).
where β = 1
r is the steady-state discount factor the ￿rm applies to future pro￿ts
and λ = ω + βωα+ α − ωα .
2.4 Open Economy NKPC
We next reformulate the above speci￿cation in a form more appropriate for
estimation. To do so consider the element of marginal cost which is independent














































This can be log-linearised as,

























t − b Pt) (25)














(1 − ω)(1 − α)(1 − αβ)




























t − b pd
t)+( ψ − 1)b e yt). (26)
Here we can see the impact of introducing open economy considerations to
the ￿rm￿s pricing problem. Firstly, marginal costs largely re￿ect labour costs,
c Wt − b pd
t, as they do in the closed economy case. However, the weight on labour
costs in the marginal cost term re￿ects the steady-state share of labour costs in
total variable costs (labour plus intermediate goods) which, in turn, depends on
the substitutability of these two factors. Additionally, the costs of intermediate
goods relative to domestic prices, b p
f
t − b pd
t,a l s oa ﬀects the marginal costs of
production. Finally, the level of output at the individual ￿rm level also aﬀects
marginal costs, due to decreasing marginal returns in the two factors which are
variable in the short-run. This eﬀect is captured in the term (ψ−1)b e yt.H o w e v e r ,
here b e yt refers to average ￿rm output and not GDP due to the use of interme-
diate goods in production, which means we need to examine the link between
average ￿rm output and GDP. We also wish to consider the link between the
open economy de￿nition of marginal cost and the labour share proxy commonly
considered in the closed economy estimations of the NKPC to facilitate compar-
ison with existing studies. This is done in Appendix I, where the open economy














(1 − ω)(1 − α)(1 − αβ)






























































b st = c Wt − b Pt + b Nt − b yt − (1 − χη)b pd
t +( 1− χ)ηb p
f
t (28)
is the labour share variable5. The terms of trade eﬀect entering from the substi-
tutability between home and foreign goods in consumption is actually contained
5By substituting the log-linearised de￿nition of consumer prices (2) into this de￿nition,
the labour share variable can be rewritten as b st = c Wt + b Nt − b pd
t − b yt which does not include
9in the labour share variable as this captures the distinction between product
and consumption wages which does not arise in the closed economy case. In the
usual closed economy estimates of the Phillips curve, the log-linearised labour
share, b st,w i t hχ =1(i.e. no international trade) is the appropriate measure of
marginal cost. In the open economy case care must be made to maintain the
distinction between consumption and product wages in de￿ning the labour share
variable. This measure of marginal cost is augmented by a term in the output
gap b yt which captures the rise in marginal costs when output is above equilib-
rium given decreasing marginal returns in the variable factors of production. It
also includes a term in the price of labour relative to import prices, c Wt − b p
f
t
which re￿ects the possibility of substituting between labour and imported goods
in production. There is also a straight terms of trade term, b pd
t −b p
f
t ,w h i c hc o m e s
from the de￿nition of GDP in the presence of intermediate goods.
It should be noted that this speci￿cation nests the estimation of NKPCs in
other papers. For example, removing all the open economy elements (by ignoring
all international trade in ￿nal goods, χ =1 , and by assuming that
pfmf
pdy =0 ,
such that no imported intermediate goods are used in production), would return
us to the closed-economy speci￿cations of among others, Sbordone (2002), Gali
et al (2000 and 2001) which include estimates for the US and Euro-area. By
only allowing trade in intermediate goods, but not ￿nal goods, this reduces to
the open economy speci￿cations estimated for Spain by Gali and Lopez-Salido
(2001) and for the UK in Balakrishnan and Lopez-Salido (2001). In contrast,
in this paper we have developed a model which includes substitution not only
between labour and imported goods in production, but also between domestic
and foreign goods in consumption. We now turn to estimate our open economy
NKPC for the G7 economies.
3 Estimation and Empirical Results
In this Section we estimate the ￿deep parameters￿ of the model derived in Section
2f o rt h eG 7o v e rt h ep e r i o d1960(1)t o1999(4)6. These include the ￿rms steady-
state discount factor, β, the probability that a ￿rm can reset their price in period
t, α, the proportion of ￿rms following rule of thumb pricing behaviour in time
t, ω and the parameter measuring the elasticity of substitution between labour
and imported intermediate goods, ρ. We also examine the robustness of these
estimates and discuss them in the context of ￿ndings from other partial and
general equilibrium studies. This discussion allows us to draw a number of
conclusions of direct relevance to policy makers.
the parameter χ and is, therefore, applicable no matter how open the economy. This is the
de￿nition we shall use in our empirical work below.
6Further detail on sources and methods is reported in the Appendix II.
103.1 Empirical Considerations and Estimator
Prior to estimating (27) for the G7 economies it is necessary to obtain data for
the steady-state ratio of imported goods used in production relative to GDP,
pfmf
pdy , and the steady-state labour share s. It is readily apparent from the
data that the ratio of imported intermediate goods relative to GDP has been
growing in line with the ratio of imports to GDP. Accordingly, estimating an
open economy NKPC assuming that the importance of imports in production
was constant, would imply too great a weight on open economy eﬀects in the
1970s and too small a weight in the 1990s, cet. par. To account for this we
replace this ratio with actual data rather than an average across the sample.
This has the desired eﬀect of appropriately capturing the increasing importance
of imported goods in production over time. For consistency we also use actual
data for the labour share and in calibrating ψ to calculate the weights on the
open economy terms in our NKPC7. To obtain the latter, consider the labour







which, by noting the de￿nition of GDP can be used to derive an estimate of ψ















To calculate ψ and when estimating (27) we follow the literature and adopt
values for the elasticity of demand facing the ￿rm, θ. The parameter, θ implies
a mark-up of prices over marginal costs, ￿ of θ
θ−1 which we assume to be 10%,
so that θ =1 1 . We also consider the robustness of our results to changing this
assumed parameter by reducing θ to 3.5 which implies a mark-up of 40%8. Note
that this is a similar range of values to those considered in Gali et al (2001)a n d
encompasses the values adopted in the literature.
Given that our model incorporates forward looking rational expectations
( R E ) ,w ee m p l o yH a n s e n ￿ s( 1982) generalised method of moments (GMM) es-
timator which easily handles the set of orthogonality conditions suggested by
the RE hypothesis. In this context and incorporating time-varying measures of
pfmf

















(1 − ω)(1 − α)(1 − αβ)




7However, we also considered the implications for our results of adopting straightforward
averages for these ratios and these are discussed below.
8See Appendix III for detailed results.
11where






















































tyt ;λ = ω + βωα+ α − ωα; zt is a vector
of instruments9, including 4 lags of demeaned price in￿ation, b π
d, wage in￿ation,
b π
w, commodity price in￿ation, b π
c, the labour share, b s the output gap, b y and a
constant term; all other variables are de￿n e da si nS e c t i o n2 .F u r t h e rn o t et h a t
hatted rates are calculated as deviations away from a constant mean and hatted
levels and relative prices are calculated as deviations away from a quadratic
trend10. Finally we assume that Et(zt,ut)=0.
3.2 Interpretation of Results
We next turn to the GMM estimates of (31). Table 1 gives the results for our
central estimates of the NKPC across four model variants. Model M1 represents
the closed-economy estimates which are comparable with the ￿gures for the US
in Gali et al (op. cit.). M2 introduces the open economy eﬀects considered
above and freely estimates, ρ, the elasticity of substitution between imports
used in production and labour. As for all economies, except the US, this co-
eﬃcient is not signi￿cantly diﬀerent from 1.I nm o d e lM3 we replace the CES
production function with a Cobb-Douglas formulation by imposing ρ =1 .F i -
nally, in variant M4 we reduce the elasticity of substitution between imported
production imports and labour to 1/3 in line with the assumption of McCallum
(2001).
If we consider the closed economy estimates ￿rst, we can see the estimates
of the degree of nominal inertia, α, and the proportion of ￿rm￿s which follow
backward-looking rules of thumb, ω are all highly signi￿cantly and economically
plausible. We can estimate the average time it takes for all prices to adjust in an
economy as 1
1−α and this implies that the country with least inertia is Italy with
average price adjustment taking only 6 months, closely followed by the US at 6.5
months, the UK at just under 7 months, Canada at slightly less than 9 months,
9Our instruments set is based on the one used in Gal￿ and Gertler (1999). We conduct
Hansen￿s J-test below to test the validity of our overidentifying restrictions since we have more
instruments than parameters to estimate.
10Both these transformations are common in this literature, see e.g. Gali et al (1999 and
2001). The rates include: πp, πw, πc and, s and the levels and relative prices include: y,
W − pf and pd − pf.
12Japan at 9 months, France at just over 9 months and Germany being an outlier
with the longest time between price adjustment across all ￿rms in the economy
of close to 2 years. The ranking of economies according to the estimated degree
of inertia is not implausible with the US, UK and Canada in general possessing
a greater degree of price ￿exibility than the European economies within the
G7 or Japan. The apparent degree of price ￿exibility in Italy is perhaps more
surprising, especially when compared with other EMU members. However, in
Italy the proportion of ￿rms adopting backward-looking rules of thumb is the
highest at 39% and so these estimates possibly re￿ect the existence of indexation
mechanisms rather than genuine price ￿exibility. In relation to other studies the
estimates for the US are in line with other studies in the literature such as, for
example, Gali et al (op. cit.), and Leith and Malley (op. cit.). The ￿gures for
Canada are also consistent with those reported in Gagnon and Kahn (2001).
The estimates of the degree of backward-looking behaviour also vary across
the G7 economies, ranging from 6% of ￿r m si nt h eU Kt o3 9 %i nI t a l y . I t
also appears, with the exception of the UK, that the less frequently a country
changes prices then the more likely ￿rms are to use backward-looking rules of
thumb. This probably re￿ects the information gathering costs implicit in setting
ap r o ￿t-maximising price and the costs of failing to maximise pro￿ts. If ￿rms
only change prices infrequently then they will use all available information to set
that price carefully when the opportunity arises, while with less nominal inertia
there are less costs involved in setting a rule of thumb price. The estimates
of β are in line with other studies, although as a discount factor based on the
equilibrium risk-free real interest rate they are low, probably re￿ecting the fact
that ￿rms discount the future more heavily than this to take account of elements
of risk not formally included in our model.
When we introduce the open economy elements in model M2 then this does
not signi￿cantly alter the estimates of the ￿rms￿ discount factor, β, the probabil-
ity of price adjustment, α, and the proportion of backward-looking price setters,
ω (see column 1 of Tables 2 and 3 for the t-stats associated with testing the
null that the α￿s and ω￿s estimated in the open economy speci￿cation are sig-
ni￿cantly diﬀerent from those estimated in model M2). The countries in which
introducing open economy aspects makes the greatest diﬀerence are Canada and
France and to a lesser extent Italy and the UK. A relatively closed economy,
such as the US, experiences no change in the estimated degree of price inertia
at all through adding open economy considerations. These diﬀerences translate
into an increase in the estimate of the average time for all ￿rms to adjust their
prices in Canada from 9 to 11 months. However, it must be stressed that this
diﬀerence is not statistically signi￿cant, and the changes in other countries are
even smaller. The estimated proportion of rule of thumb price setters is also
largely invariant to introducing open economy eﬀects - the estimated proportion
of backward-looking price setters, changes by less than 3%, with most countries
experiencing far smaller changes. Again, these changes are insigni￿cant in sta-
tistical terms. The fact that the NKPC description of ￿rms￿ pricing bahaviour
does not appear to be aﬀected by open economy variables, suggests that ￿rms are
absorbing changes in mark-ups generated by movements in these variables. In
13other words, our results suggest that there may be signi￿cant pricing-to-market
behaviour amongst the G7 economies.
In M3 we consider the impact of imposing a Cobb-Douglas form of pro-
duction function by setting the elasticity of substitution between labour and
imported intermediate goods, ρ,t o1. This restriction is a valid restriction on
the freely estimated values of ρ for all countries except the US. Again imposing
the Cobb-Douglas form in our open economy model has no signi￿cant eﬀect
on the estimated parameters of the model. Finally, in M4 we impose a lower
elasticity of substitution between imported intermediate goods and labour in
production of 1/3. This is consistent with the value imposed in McCallum
(2001) and severely limits the extent to which labour can be substituted for
imported goods in production in response to price changes (and therefore limits
the extent to which ￿rms can insulate marginal costs from changes in the price
of imports used in production). Imposing this elasticity, signi￿cantly reduces
the estimated time period of price adjustment in Germany, and increases the
proportion of backward-looking price setting in Italy. It has a negligible and
insigni￿cant impact on other parameters estimates for other countries. This
change brings the estimate of inertia in Germany closer to the estimates for
other countries in our sample and increases the estimated level of backward-
looking behaviour to 50% in the case of Italy. However, we also see from Table
4, that imposing this value of ρ is not a valid parameter restriction on the freely
estimated ρ in the case of Italy and the US, but is for the other G7 economies. In
other countries imposing this elasticity of substitution does not signi￿cantly af-
fect the estimates of the degree of nominal inertia. Our results therefore appear
to suggest that introducing open economy considerations to the NKPC does
not signi￿cantly aﬀect the estimated degrees of nominal inertia and backward-
looking behaviour for the G7 economies. Of course, this does not imply that
analysis of the impact of monetary and ￿scal policy need only consider closed
economy models. In a general equilibrium context, open economy factors could
have a signi￿cant impact through the endogenous determination of the labour
share which is very in￿uential in price-setting behaviour in the NKPC. This
observation notwithstanding, we can safely conclude that our estimates can be
employed in a wide variety of closed and open economy models which are nested
within our general speci￿cation.

















































































































































































N o t e s : ( i )U S A ,C A N ,G B R ,F R A ,D E U ,I T Aa n dJ P Na r ea b b r e v i a t i o n sf o r
the US, Canada, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Japan respectively; (ii) * and **
indicates a signi￿cant t-test at the 1 and 5% levels respectively; (iii) the t-tests are
calculated using heteroscedastic consistent standard errors; (iv) all t-tests are based
on the null hypothesis of the estimated parameter being equal to zero (except for ρ
which tests away from a null of unity); (v) in M3 and M4 the parameter ρ is restricted
to unity and one-third respectively.
15Table 2: T-tests Equality of the α0s
M2-M1 M3-M1 M4-M1
USA 0.0003 (0.008) 0.010 (0.27) 0.091 (1.89)
CAN 0.063 (0.64) 0.073 (0.78) 0.111 (1.16)
GBR 0.046 (1.21)0 . 0 3 2 ( 1.07) 0.035 (1.27)
FRA 0.060 (0.86) 0.024 (0.60) 0.017 (0.36)
DEU -0.004 (-0.04) -0.039 (-0.76) -0.090 (-2.29)**
ITA 0.052 (1.18) 0.044 (1.00) 0.098 (1.70)
JPN -0.039 (-0.49) 0.032 (0.36) -0.069 (-1.11)
Note: the above ￿gures are the parameter diﬀerences across models and
the numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
Table 3: T-Tests for Equality of the ω0s
M1 vM 2 M1 vM 3 M1 vM 4
USA -0.034 (-0.77) -0.003 (-0.06) 0.063 (1.25)
CAN 0.014( 0 . 17) 0.020 (0.29) 0.042 (0.63)
GBR 0.008 (0.26) 0.002 (0.09) 0.005 (0.16)
FRA 0.007 (0.21) 0.003 (0.09) 0.004 (0.14)
DEU -0.026 (-0.44) -0.018( - 0 . 3 1) -0.048 (-0.96)
ITA 0.023 (0.43) 0.037 (0.86) 0.108 (2.37)*
JPN 0.010( 0 . 17) 0.013 (0.24) -0.019( - 0 . 4 3 )
Note: the above ￿gures are the parameter diﬀerences across models
and the numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
Table 4: Wald Tests for ρ








Note: the above tests are distributed
χ2(1). The critical values at the 1
and 5% levels are 6.63 and 3.84
respectively.
As a check on the robustness of our results, Tables 5-8 (see Appendix III)
reports the same statistics as Tables 1-4 but for a much higher mark-up of 40%.
Raising this mark-up tends to increase the estimates of nominal inertia implied
by the α parameter. However, again these results are not materially aﬀected by
introducing the open economy eﬀects outlined in this paper. Finally, we also
imposed constant ratios of imported intermediate goods to GDP rather than
16allow them to trend upwards over time, and found the estimates reported in the
paper to be robust to this change11.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we developed a model of ￿rms￿ pricing behaviour in the context of
an open economy model, where imperfectly competitive ￿rms sell their products
both at home and abroad, and produce their good by using a combination
of local labour, capital and imported intermediate goods. This allows us to
introduce various terms of trade eﬀects in￿uencing the ￿rm￿s pricing decision,
in addition to labour costs which dominate most closed-economy speci￿cations
of the NKPC. We assumed that ￿rms were subject to the constraints on the
timing of their price changes in the form of Calvo(1983) contracts, such that
they can only change price after a random interval of time has passed. We
also allow ￿rms to operate two types of pricing policy. The ￿rst is where ￿rms
attempt to maximise the discounted value of pro￿ts, while under the second
a ￿rm may choose to follow a simple rule of thumb which updates prices in
line with observed price changes and in￿ation. This setup gave rise to a hybrid
open economy NKPC which nests all of the speci￿cations adopted in empirical
work on individual countries. We then estimated this speci￿cation for the G7
economies.
Our empirical results suggest that the US, Canada and UK economies suﬀer
from less price inertia than European members of the G7 and Japan. A notable
exception to this rule is Italy, although here the proportion of backward-looking
price setters is the highest in the G7, possibly suggesting that the relatively
frequent price adjustment in Italy is a result of indexation mechanisms rather
than more conventional notions of price ￿exibility. Another interesting result is
that ￿rms in countries where the frequency of price change is greatest are more
likely to employ backward-looking rules of thumb. This probably re￿ects the
fact that the costs of failing to set a price optimally are lower when that price
is unlikely to remain in place for long.
Another key ￿nding is that these results hold true whether we adopt a closed
economy or an open economy speci￿cation of the Phillips curve, i.e. our esti-
mates of model parameters are not signi￿cantly diﬀerent under these alternative
speci￿cations. This implies that estimated price-setting behaviour is not being
aﬀected by changes in these additional terms of trade eﬀects introduced by con-
sidering open economy aspects of ￿rms￿ pricing decisions. This may re￿ect the
existence of signi￿cant pricing to market behaviour, implying that ￿rms simply
absorb the changes in pro￿t margins implied by movement in these open econ-
omy variables. Additionally, we found that we could not reject the restriction
that the elasticity of substitution between imported goods and labour in pro-
duction was unity (i.e. the Cobb-Douglas case) for all the G7 economies, except
11To preserve space these results are not reported here but will be made available on request
from the authors.
17the US. Again, imposing this parameter restriction (even for the US) did not
materially aﬀect estimates of the degree of nominal inertia in the G7. This sug-
gests that our parameter estimates can be used in a wide-variety of theoretical
a n ds i m u l a t i o nw o r k ,b o t hi nc l o s e da n do p e ne c o n o m yc o n t e x t s ,a n dw i t ha
variety of production functions. An obvious extension of our research would be
to incorporate the open economy NKPC into a general equilibrium framework,
such as those employed in the New Open Economy Macroeconomics, so that
the quantitative importance of an endogenous labour share on price setting and
in turn the eﬀectiveness of monetary and ￿scal policy could be established.
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19Appendix I - Operationalising the Open Economy NKPC
To transform our Phillips curve to a form more appropriate for estimation
and to facilitate comparability with existing studies it is necessary to relate the
open economy measure of marginal cost to the typical closed economy proxy,
the ratio of labour income to GDP. To do so recall that average ￿rm output in
the presence of intermediate good inputs is given by,









where e yt is average ￿rm output and and yt is real GDP. After log-linearisation
this implies,
b e yt =
pdy
pdy + pfmf b yt +
pfmf
pdy + pfmf (b m
f
t + b p
f
t − b pd
t). (33)
Substituting the expression for the optimal level of imported intermediate goods,(10),
and solving for average ￿rm output gives,
b e yt =
pdy
pdy +( 1− ψ)pfmf b yt+
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Another way of rewriting this is in terms of the labour share variable, e.g.
b st = c Wt − b Pt + b Nt − b yt − (1 − χη)b pd
t +( 1− χ)ηb p
f
t (36)
Substituting for the ￿rst-order condition for labour demand (9) and using the
de￿nition of consumer prices yields,
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20Substituting for the average ￿rm output yields,
b st = c Wt + ψ(
pdy
pdy +( 1− ψ)pfmf b yt
+
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Collecting terms,
b st =( ψ − 1)(
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This can be rewritten by noting the following relationships. Consider the share
of labour costs relative to labour and intermediate goods costs,
WN
WN + pfmf (40)
21Dividing through by N and utilising the equation for the cost-minimising com-









Therefore, since labour share data, and the ratio of imported intermediate goods
to GDP,
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and re-write the Phillips curve
as equation (27) in the main text.
Appendix II - Data Sources
The following data were obtained from the OECD￿s Business Sector Data-
base: real GDP (market prices), y;G D P( m a r k e tp r i c e )d e ￿ator, pd;n o m i n a l
compensation of employees, WN; nominal wage per employee, W;r e a li m p o r t s
of goods and services, Mf;i m p o r tp r i c ed e ￿ator, pf; and employment, N.T h e
data run from 1960 quarter 1 to 1999 quarter 4 and are quoted in local cur-
rency units. The world commodity price index, cp was obtained from the IMF￿s
International Financial Statistics database. The data used to calculate the av-
erage value of imported goods used in production as a share of total imports
were obtained from CEPII￿s CHELEM (Harmonised Accounts on Trade and
the World Economy) database. The 71 product categories available from 1967
to 1998 have been classi￿ed by CEPII into the following sectoral stages of pro-
duction: primary, basic manufacturing, intermediate goods, equipment goods,
mixed products and consumption goods and ￿not elsewhere speci￿ed￿ products.
To calculate our measure of average value of imported goods used in production
as a share of total imports we include primary, basic manufacturing, intermedi-
ate goods and equipment goods in the numerator. The ￿gures for the G-7 by
country are: USA=0.609, CAN=0.705, GBR=0.634, FRA=0.678, DEU=0.647,
ITA=0.689 and JPN=0.740.
22Appendix III - Results

















































































































































































N o t e s : ( i )U S A ,C A N ,G B R ,F R A ,D E U ,I T Aa n dJ P Na r ea b b r e v i a t i o n sf o r
the US, Canada, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Japan respectively; (ii) * and **
indicates a signi￿cant t-test at the 1 and 5% levels respectively; (iii) the t-tests are
calculated using heteroscedastic consistent standard errors; (iv) all t-tests are based
on the null hypothesis of the estimated parameter being equal to zero (except for ρ
which tests away from a null of unity); (v) in M3 and M4 the parameter ρ is restricted
to unity and one-third respectively.
23Table 6: T-Tests for Equality of the α0s
M2-M1 M3-M1 M4-M1
USA 0.005 (0.17) 0.009 (0.27) 0.069 (1.65)
CAN 0.070 (0.76) 0.070 (0.89) 0.099 (1.22)
GBR 0.031 (0.96) 0.022 (0.82) 0.022 (0.87)
FRA 0.046 (0.81)0 . 0 17( 0 . 5 4 ) 0 . 0 12 (0.30)
DEU 0.011 (0.14) -0.009 (-0.20) -0.059 (-1.75)
ITA 0.050 (1.32) 0.041 (1.10) 0.078 (1.59)
JPN -0.031 (-0.45) 0.037 (0.45) -0.055 (-0.99)
Note: the above ￿gures are the parameter diﬀerences across models
and the numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
Table 7: T-Tests for Equality of the ω0s
M2-M1 M3-M1 M4-M1
USA -0.035 (-0.69) -0.007 (-0.16) 0.053 (0.95)
CAN 0.016( 0 . 18) 0.017 (0.23) 0.035 (0.49)
GBR 0.004 (0.12) 0.022 (-0.03) 0.0009 (0.03)
FRA 0.005 (0.15) 0.002 (0.05) 0.003 (0.10)
DEU -0.024 (-0.39) -0.005 (-0.07) -0.038 (-0.04)
ITA 0.022 (0.40) 0.036 (0.84) 0.100 (2.34)**
JPN 0.016( 0 . 2 4 ) 0 . 0 15 (0.25) -0.012( - 0 . 2 4 )
Note: the above ￿gures are the parameter diﬀerences across models and
the numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
Table 8: Wald Tests for ρ
ρ =1 ρ =0 .33







Note: the above tests are distributed
χ2(1). The critical values at the 1
and 5% levels are 6.63 and 3.84
respectively.
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